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Public frustration with Congress harms the majority party’s
brand and its chances of winning both local and presidential
elections.
In the 2016 election cycle, President Obama’s popularity will influence the Democrats’ chances of
winning, while Congress’ popularity will be important for the Republican Party, writes David
Jones. In new research, he finds that in an era of high polarization in Congress, voter disapproval
for the body can harm the electoral chances of the majority party – in this case the GOP – at both
the national and the state level.
It is uncontroversial to say that as the 2016 presidential election nears, the fortunes of the
Democratic Party’s nominee will be heavily influenced by the relative popularity of President
Obama. What may be more surprising to learn is that the fortunes of the Republican Party’s nominee in 2016 will
be significantly influenced by the relative popularity of the US Congress. In fact, not only will public attitudes
towards Congress affect the race for the nation’s highest office, they will even affect thousands of state legislative
contests at the local level.
In many ways, the claim that congressional performance ratings might affect any election seems strange. For
several decades, conventional wisdom has held that congressional politics is too confusing for average
Americans. People might disapprove of Congress’s job performance, but they are generally unable to discern
who, exactly, is responsible. Therefore, low ratings of Congress are expected to have little impact on elections.
However, much of this conventional wisdom was formed during an era in which parties in Congress were
relatively undifferentiated from one another in their voting. Figure 1 below shows that in 1970, the average
difference between Democrats voting yes versus Republicans voting yes on roll calls in Congress was only 21
percent (four-year moving average). But by 2010, the average level of partisan difference had more than doubled
to 54 percent. This increasing partisan polarization has fundamentally changed the way that the public perceives
congressional politics.
Figure 1 – Partisan Polarization in Congress, 1958-2010
In an era when partisan polarization in Congress was low, actions of Congress tended to have support from
members of both parties, providing the public with little sense of which party was responsible for legislative
outcomes. In contrast, with greater partisan polarization in Congress, members of the majority party vote more as
a unified team, opposed by the minority party. Citizens are more likely to recognize that the parties in Congress
are distinct from each other, and that it is primarily the majority party that is responsible for Congress’s work
product. As a result, those who dislike the performance of Congress are more likely to see this as a failing of the
majority party specifically.
One way this change manifests itself is in congressional elections. For example, research shows that as
polarization has increased in Congress, public disapproval of Congress has become more and more harmful for
congressional candidates from the majority party.
But an even more surprising result is that the effects of public dissatisfaction with Congress can also reach
beyond the narrow confines of that institution to include a party’s overall brand image in politics. In 2008,
President George W. Bush’s sagging approval ratings were said to have harmed the brand of his entire party. In
similar fashion, an unpopular Congress can harm the overall brand of the party that controls the legislative branch
of government.
Figure 2 below illustrates the effects of congressional performance ratings on Americans’ relative warmth towards
the parties, as measured on a 100-point scale. With low polarization, approving rather than disapproving of
Congress makes a relatively small difference in a person’s rating of the majority party. But at the highest levels of
polarization, the effect of congressional performance evaluations increases by over 50 percent. In contrast, the
effect of congressional performance evaluations on ratings of the minority party hovers closer to zero, without any
meaningful change as congressional partisan polarization increases. Thus with greater clarity of party differences
in Congress, public disapproval of Congress is disproportionately problematic for the brand of the majority party.
And, while the size of the effect of congressional approval may not seem very substantial, it is actually not too
dissimilar from the much-noted effect of presidential approval on his party’s brand rating—about two-thirds as
large.
Figure 2 – Polarization in Congress and the Effect of Congressional Performance Evaluations on Party
Brand Favorability
How favorably citizens feel towards a party has important consequences in elections. Political psychologists find
that the feelings a voter has towards a political party’s brand transfer to any political candidate running under that
party label, even when voters have contradictory information about that candidate. Thus any factor that harms a
party’s brand has the potential to affect all partisan elections. Because polarization increases the effect of
congressional performance ratings on party brand favorability, it also increases the effect of congressional
performance ratings on a variety of elections—even those outside Congress.
Figure 3 below illustrates the effect of approving of Congress on voting in presidential elections. With low
polarization, approving of Congress increases the odds of supporting the presidential candidate from the same
party as the congressional majority by 18 percent. With high polarization, approving of Congress increases those
odds by 28 percent.
Figure 3 – Effect of Congressional Performance Evaluations, Mediated by Majority Party Favorability, on
Voting for President
Similar effects are found in elections to state legislatures. The left side of Figure 4 below shows that with low
levels of polarization, congressional evaluations have a negligible effect on state legislative elections. In contrast,
at polarization’s peak, a ten-point increase in Congress’s job performance rating produces a 1.8-point increase in
the percentage of state legislative seats held by the party in control of Congress. In fact, the effect of
congressional ratings in these elections is even greater than the effect of presidential ratings.
Figure 4 – Effect of Congressional Performance Evaluations, Mediated by Majority Party Favorability, on
Partisan Seat Change in State Legislatures
Given these findings, it becomes easier to understand why Republican leaders such as departing House Speaker
John Boehner have vowed not to shut down the government in 2015, even though this stand is relatively
controversial among rank-and-file members of his party. What Boehner understands is that avoiding actions that
diminish perceptions of Congress among the general population helps preserve the overall party brand, thereby
sparing electoral hardship for all candidates running as Republicans.
While there may be greater electoral incentives for the majority party in Congress to govern responsibly, the
opposite is true for the minority party. If perceptions of a strong congressional performance benefit all candidates
from the majority party, members in the minority have heightened motivation to obstruct and denigrate the work of
Congress. In this way they can damage the electoral prospects of candidates from the opposing majority party,
thereby helping their fellow partisans.
This article is based on the paper “Partisan Polarization and the Effect of Congressional Performance Evaluations
on Party Brands and American Elections” in Political Research Quarterly. 
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